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Based on 31 case studies, this study tests the validity of four major managerial 
hypotheses for manufacturers in China after WTO accession. It is argued that the 
skills of managers will be severely tested in four specific areas after China 
accedes to the WTO: (1) preparing for trade disputes with their overseas 
competitors, (2) developing newer and higher value-added products and 
diversifying their markets, (3) selecting the appropriate localization strategy, (4) 
and upgrading manufacturing processes and work practices to comply with 
international (and regional) standards, as well as being aware of overseas 
competitors using these standards as non-trade barriers. Managers also have to 
strike a delicate balance to deal with these interrelated challenges under the 
constraints of time and available resources.  
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After the Chinese delegate signed the World Trade Organization (WTO) accord in 
November 2001, China formally agreed on the accession treaties after 15 years of 
on-and-off negotiations.1 It has been widely recognized that China will become 
the “factory of the world” in the twenty-first century. Most analysts regarded this 
as a golden opportunity for foreign entrepreneurs to “jump on the bandwagon” by 
investing in China. 
LITERATURE REVIEWS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESE 
Apart from general studies (e.g. Kong, 2000; Woo, 2001), much of the literature 
about WTO accession by China has focused on three themes. First, some 
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examined the impact of WTO accession on the vitality of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in China, e.g. Blumental (1999), Liu and Woo (2001). Second, some 
studied the implications of WTO accession for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and international trade between China and other developed countries (DCs), e.g. 
Wang (1999), Ianchovichina and Martin (2001). Third, some identified the 
competitiveness of specific industries in China, e.g., agriculture (Yamamoto, 2000; 
Thiers, 2002), textile and clothing (Zhong and Yang, 2000; Yeung and Mok, 
forthcoming), automobiles (Sun, 2000; Harwitt, 2001), pharmaceuticals (Yeung, 
2002a), banking and finance (Langlois, 2001; Bottelier, 2002) and the 
telecommunications sector (Shen, 2000; DeWoskin, 2001), etc. All of the above 
studies are able to illustrate the impact of WTO accession on the Chinese 
economy in one way or another.  
 For the firm management in China, prior research has typically 
emphasized on the general practices of human resource management  (Ng and 
Warner, 2000; Björkman and Lu, 2000), on the specialized study of employee 
motivation system in Sino-foreign joint ventures (JVs) (Goodall and Warner, 1997; 
Braun and Warner, 2002), and on the difficulties in managing transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in China (Child, 1999, 2000; Tsang, 2001). Other studies 
examined the characteristics of strategic decision making of Chinese managers of 
SOEs and privately owned enterprises. As a limited number of managers in China 
have experience to compete in a market-based economy (Björkman and Lu, 1999), 
Nolan (2001a, 2001b) argued that the innovativeness of mangers have significant 
implications for the competitiveness of Chinese industry during the transitional 
period of industrial deregulation. Tan (2001) also found that proactive 
entrepreneurs (often described as risk takers and innovators) have high chances 
for survival in an evolving and changing environment. All these studies analyze 
the managerial problems in Chinese manufacturers in different perspectives. 
However, there are virtually no published papers on the managerial challenges for 
Chinese manufacturers with regard to WTO accession. 
To fill this gap in the literature, this study investigates the major 
managerial challenges for manufacturers in China after WTO accession.2 China 
being one of the largest global manufacturers, its accession to the WTO has 
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tremendous implications for the management and development of the 
manufacturing sectors in China. Based on the WTO accession treaties and the 
existing nature of Chinese manufacturers (see the main text), we develop four 
hypotheses on the managerial challenges for manufacturers in China. 
WTO accession will eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the annual 
renewal of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) by the US, but it will not 
reduce the possibility of trade disputes between China and other countries for at 
least another 14 years, since the US/EU can still use its current anti-dumping 
methodology, special safeguard and product-specific safeguard mechanisms 
during this transitional period (see the main text) (Dong et al., 1998; Potter, 
2001).3 Therefore, we would expect that: 
Hypothesis 1: China’s accession to the WTO will drive Chinese 
manufacturers to develop contingency plans for handling the potential trade 
disputes with international trading partners. 
Low prices and a quality product are necessary, but no longer sufficient, 
for success in China during the post-accession era. Intense competition for market 
share is expected, partly due to the elimination of local content and foreign-
exchange balancing requirements for foreign-financed firms, as well as the 
reduction of import tariffs and the opening up of distribution channels in China 
(Adhikari and Yang, 2002). Foreign-financed firms in China are no longer 
constrained by their production contracts and other Customs documentation and 
thus are able to sell their products locally and at competitive prices. 4  The 
subsidiaries of TNCs can also expand their retail chains in China and import their 
brand name products without paying for high tariffs (Yeung and Mok, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, Sino-foreign JVs in China may have to compete with 
parallel imports of the same brand products (see the main text). We would 
therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: China’s accession to the WTO will drive Chinese 
manufacturers to upgrade the value-added chain of their products and to 
diversify their markets. 
While Chinese firms are expecting to access to advanced managerial and 
technical know-how by hiring expatriates, there are three possible drawbacks for 
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firms top-heavy with expatriates, e.g. the mismatch between expatriates’ generous 
remuneration packages and their job responsibilities, their less contact with the 
international market, and cultural conflicts (Li and Kleiner, 2001; Legewie, 2002). 
Chinese manufacturers may have to accelerate their localization process to address 
these challenges. We would thus expect that: 
Hypothesis 3: China’s accession to the WTO will drive Chinese 
manufacturers to accelerate the localization of management. 
Hypothesis 3a: The mismatch between expatriates’ generous remuneration 
packages and their job responsibilities will have negative impacts on 
Chinese manufacturers. 
Hypothesis 3b: The less contact with the international market by expatriates 
will lead to conflicts in Chinese manufacturers. 
Hypothesis 3c: The cultural differences between expatriates and locals will 
have negative impacts on working relationship in Chinese manufacturers. 
In international business, it is pivotal for management to consider the 
compliance with international standards, given that the consumers in importing 
countries are increasingly concerned with the impact of trade liberalization on the 
environment and on societies (Martinsons et al., 1997). To improve the 
competitiveness of their products, international buyers are increasingly requesting 
their suppliers to comply with international standards (Yeung and Mok, 
forthcoming). As the WTO accession is expected to nurture further trade 
liberalization, in order to enhance the competitiveness of their products, Chinese 
manufacturers have to be aware of the compliance with international standards. 
Therefore, we would expect that:  
Hypothesis 4: China’s accession to the WTO will catalyze Chinese 




To examine these issues, informal interviews with government officials and semi-
structured interviews with 36 owners and managers of 31 manufacturing firms 
located in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces and in the municipality of Beijing 
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were conducted by the authors in April-May of 2000 and August of 2001.5 The 
interviews and firm visits were conducted with the facilitation of various institutes 
in China, especially the Management Commission of the Hangzhou Economic and 
Technology Development Zone in Zhejiang, the Bureau for Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade and the Guangdong Provincial Research Centre for Economic 
Development in Guangdong. It is a well-known fact that securing the appropriate 
personal connections is probably the most important precondition for conducting 
visits to firms in China. This explains why the majority of firms investigated are 
either located in Guangdong (16 cases) or Zhejiang (13 cases). Unsurprisingly, 
most of the firms located in Guangdong are financed by Hong Kong-based 
entrepreneurs, whilst most firms interviewed in Zhejiang are financed by 
Taiwanese or Japanese (partly due to their locations and historical ties).  
Each interview and firm visit lasted for at least an hour and the questions 
were focused on empirical evidence related to the hypotheses testing of this study, 
viz., about trade disputes, product and market development, localization, and 
international standards. The field survey co-ordinators (including several 
government officials) accompanied the researchers during the interviews and firm 
visits, but they never intervened in the interviews. On several occasions, 
interviewees were willing to share their opinions on issues related to WTO 
accession with us, including criticisms against the government for being secretive 
and for lacking preparation for WTO accession, in front of the government 
officials (see the main text).  
The sample firms ranged across various investment formats – wholly 
foreign-owned ventures (WFVs) (ten cases), equity joint ventures (EJVs) (11 
cases), processing and assembling (P&As) (six cases) and locally-funded (four 
cases) firms.6 They also ranged across manufacturing sectors: textiles and clothing 
(15 cases), electrical and power appliances (five cases), beverages and food 
ingredients (three cases), plastics products (including toys, two cases), 
telecommunications, automobile components, petrochemicals, medical equipment, 
electronic products and packaging materials. With the exception of three smaller-
size firms (two P&A clothing firms in Guangdong and another locally-funded 
clothing firm in Zhejiang), all of the other sample textile and clothing firms are 
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large-scale ones with registered capital of at least several million US dollars and 
employing several hundreds to thousands of workers. The samples on textile and 
clothing firms incorporate mainly the subsidiaries of TNCs, major sub-contractors 
for designer brand clothing or major department stores in the United States (US) 
and Europe, e.g. Kellwood (US), May Department Store, J.C. Penny, K-mart, etc. 
Other TNCs in the sample include Motorola, Siemens and Nestlé. The sample size 
is relatively small but representative of the manufacturing firms in southern and 
south-eastern China, especially the foreign-financed ones. 
Chinese manufacturing and the WTO accession treaties will be reviewed 
briefly in the next section, before we investigate the major managerial challenges 
to Chinese manufacturers after WTO accession. The analysis will be based on the 
testing of four hypotheses outlined earlier: trade disputes, product and market 
development, localization, and international standards. The major findings of this 
study will be summarized in the conclusion. 
BACKGROUND 
Chinese Manufacturing  
China has been the second most popular destination for FDI in the last 
nine consecutive years, behind the US. At the end of 2001, the total FDI in China 
was US$393.5 billion, averaging US$43.4 billion per annum during 1996-2001 
(NBS, 2002). The value of FDI is expected to reach US$50 billion in 2002 (TS, 4 
October 2002). With such a large amount of FDI and a large proportion of it 
invested in manufacturing (66% in 2001), it is not surprising that China ranked 
fourth as a global manufacturing power by producing US$400 billion of goods in 
2000. This is equivalent to 34% of GDP in China. Manufacturing is the second 
largest employer (81 million workers) in China and it accounts for a significant 
proportion of the exports (82% in 2001) (NBS, 2002). In terms of output, China 
ranks first in the world on 80 products in ten manufacturing sectors, e.g. 60% of 
toys, sporting goods and footwears imported by the US were made in China (TS, 
12 April 2002; CEI, 5 August 2002). 
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WTO Accession Treaties  
According to the WTO accord signed in November 2001, the major areas of 
liberalization related to manufacturing sectors are as follows (White House, 2001; 
MOFTEC, 2001): 
• Export quotas, safeguard mechanism and anti-dumping: 
ª The deal incorporates the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), 
signed in 1995, under which the Multilateral Fibre Agreement (MFA) 
restrictions (export quotas) on textile and clothing sector will be phased 
out by 1 January 2005.7 
ª The special safeguard mechanism to prevent a surge of imports will 
remain in effect until 31 December 2008. The product-specific safeguard 
which determines the “market disruption” caused by a specific product 
will remain in force for 12 years after Chinese accession. 
ª Overseas markets maintain their current anti-dumping methodology 
(treating China as a “non-market economy”) in future anti-dumping and 
countervailing cases for 15 years after China’s accession.8 
• Import tariffs, import quotas and licences: 
ª Tariffs will be reduced from an average of 24.6% in 2001 to an average of 
9.4% (7.1% on US priority products) by 1 January 2005. 
ª China will reduce the tariffs on automobiles from the current 80-100% to 
25%, and automobile parts from an average of 23.4% to 10% by 1 July 
2006, respectively. 
ª China will participate in the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 
and eliminate all tariffs on computers and computer equipment, 
telecommunications equipment, semi-conductors and other high-
technology products by 1 January 2005. 
ª Import quotas and other quantitative restrictions will increase from the 
current trade level of 15% per annum and be phased out no later than 2005. 
• Trading and distribution rights: 
ª Foreign-financed firms will have comprehensive trading and distribution 
rights in China for the first time, including of goods made in China. 
ª The rights will be phased in progressively over three years. 
• TRIPS and TRIMs: 
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ª China will implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the Uruguay Round upon 
accession.9 
ª China will implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs). China will eliminate foreign exchange balancing and 
local content requirements upon accession and not enforce provisions in 
existing (JV) contracts that impose these requirements. 
• SOEs, taxes and fees: 
ª China will ensure that the sale and purchase of SOEs and state-invested 
enterprises (SIEs) are based solely on commercial considerations rather 
than on “government procurement”. 
ª The SOEs and SIEs are regulated under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, e.g. no export subsidies, no soft loans, etc. 
ª China will apply uniform taxes and fees to domestic-funded and foreign-
financed firms. 
WTO ACCESSION AND MANAGERIAL CHALLENEGES 
Based on empirical information collected from the field survey, we shall test the 
validity of the four hypotheses on the managerial challenges for manufacturers in 
China.  
Preparation for Trade Disputes 
Due to the potential disputes between the WTO accession treaties and the realities 
of the transitional economy in China, managers of Chinese manufacturers have to 
develop contingency plans for handling international trade disputes. This is 
especially the case when the current anti-dumping methodology treats China as a 
“non-market economy”, US/EU regulatory authorities can use third country 
reference prices to determine the existence of state subsidies or of the dumping of 
Chinese exports. 10  Moreover, the US/EU’s special safeguard and product-
specific safeguard mechanisms to prevent a surge of imports will not be phased 
out until 2008 and 2014, respectively. 
The fact that China ranked first in the world on anti-dumping suits filed by 
her trading partners (about 490 suits covering 4,000 products, involving 30 
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countries and worth US$15 billion in 2002) exemplifies the urgency for managers 
to develop contingency measures for trade disputes (CD, 9 July 2002).11  But 
managers were not well-informed, as the Chinese central government did not 
distribute documents related to WTO treaties before their delegates signed the 
agreement in November 2001. Moreover, most managers in SMEs have limited or 
no experience in dealing with international trade disputes. This resulted in their 
reluctance to counter the anti-dumping charges by releasing sensitive cost and 
pricing information to the relevant authorities (Field survey, 2001). A survey 
revealed that more than half of the Chinese firms involved in anti-dumping 
charges had been reluctant to participate in foreign anti-dumping procedures. 
Subsequently, the Chinese firm was the loser in 80% of the cases (HKEJ, 18 
December 2001:21). 
It must however be emphasized that potential trade disputes do not just 
proliferate between China and the DCs, but also between China and less 
developed countries (LDCs), e.g. India has filed 51 anti-dumping suits against 
Chinese products (BIDI, 27 September 2002). This is partly because some LDCs 
relying on the exports of low value-added products are unable to beat the bargain 
basement prices charged by Chinese firms. For instance, Mexican manufactures 
make T-shirts for US$1/each and tennis shoes for US$38/pair, while their Chinese 
counterparts offer more value for money by charging US$0.20/each and 
US$13/pair, respectively (SCMP, 23 August 2001). Moreover, some LDCs 
complain of illegal shipments of Chinese goods attempting to evade import tariffs. 
It is estimated that up to half of all garments sold in Mexico are contraband. Some 
unscrupulous firms import finished garments into Mexico (but claim in the 
documents that they are partly finished) and then sell them locally or export them 
to the US (SCMP, 2 May 2001). In fact, some LDCs may want an extension of 
export quotas to protect their industries from Chinese imports, e.g. in September 
2002, Turkey imposed three-year quotas on imports of Chinese electric fans, 
spectacles frames and glasses (BIDI, 29 September 2002). 
Since the Chinese government may not be well-prepared for WTO 
accession, managers of Chinese manufacturing firms face an uphill battle in any 
future trade disputes. China had not established any specific department to deal 
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with potential trade disputes before November 2001, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC)’s legal team remains understaffed 
(SCMP, 2 November 2001; CD, 8 October 2002). The lack of co-ordination 
within, and between, different bureaux to administer foreign trade policies 
efficiently, further undermines preparations to counter anti-dumping cases (Potter, 
2001:600-601). For instance, there are no Customs officers to follow up the case 
when the officer in charge is on annual or sick leave. Worse still, it is not 
uncommon for two or more bureaux in the local government to have their senior 
officers on annual leave simultaneously (especially during the Chinese New Year). 
In arbitration cases, managers only meet with a “wall of silence”, receiving advice 
such as “I don’t deal with this; come back in two weeks when Mr. X is back!” 
(Field survey, 2001). This can cost Chinese-based firms dearly as managers are 
unable to deal with trade disputes without the full support of the corresponding 
government bureau. 
Furthermore, some managers simply do not have the resources to counter 
anti-dumping charges. In fact, the cash flow of small and medium-scale 
enterprises (SMEs) is so tight that their managers simply cannot wait for the 
outcome of the arbitration of a trade dispute (Yeung, 2002b). Generally, most 
managers in large-scale foreign-financed firms know how to navigate through the 
minefield of anti-dumping allegations (Field survey, 2001). Individual companies 
can apply for “market economy” treatment from the importing country’s 
regulatory authorities. But the transaction cost of doing so is very high, as it 
demands on-site inspection by the regulatory authorities. Thus, only 16 Chinese 
firms have been granted “market economy” treatment by the European 
Commission (CD, 11 October 2002). The two recent instances in which Chinese 
firms successfully countered charges of anti-dumping illustrate the high costs of 
fighting such disputes. After the Canadian authorities imposed a 57% anti-
dumping duty on Fuyao Glass Industry Group’s automotive replacement 
windscreen in February 2002, the company set up an anti-dumping office and 
hired US-based lawyers to prepare for the appeal. The Canadian International 
Trade Tribune eventually rejected the anti-dumping charge, saying that the higher 
selling price in China was part of the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEMs) 
contract, and their lower selling prices in Canada represented the market price for 
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the replacement market. Despite the fact that this case was resolved quickly, 
Fuyao spent more than three million yuan in legal expenses alone (CD, 10 
September 2002). The second instance involves the TV manufacturers in China. 
In 2002, the EU eventually agreed to lift the 44.6% anti-dumping duty on seven 
major TV makers in China after 15 years of on-and-off investigation. But the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce must keep track of exports on a daily basis and 
submit a fortnightly report to the EU to ensure that the products are selling at the 
minimum prices and not exceeding the quotas (CEI, 13 September 2002). Without 
support from the domestic market, it is likely that most of the TV makers will be 
unable to survive the 15-year-long anti-dumping investigation. No matter how 
efficient the WTO resolution mechanism is, the involvement of trade disputes will 
definitely divert a firm’s valuable resources from other priorities, e.g. product and 
market development. This will obviously tests the skills (in keeping up the morale 
of the workforce) and patience of managers to their limits.  
The above discussions support the hypothesis on trade disputes. Due to the 
current anti-dumping methodology and the safeguard mechanisms that can be 
initiated by trading partners, and the lack of proactive preparation by the Chinese 
government to engage in potential trade disputes, Chinese manufacturers have to 
develop contingency plans for handling the potential disputes with international 
trading partners after the accession of WTO. 
Product and Market Development 
To minimize the effects of trade disputes and to pre-empt the expected increase in 
non-trade barriers against Chinese exports, Chinese manufacturers are tooling 
their products to climb up the value-added chain and diversifying their markets. 
Managers are investing more resources on improving productivity and quality 
control, developing new products and markets, and so forth. To boost productivity, 
most managers are introducing some form of incentive package for their staff, e.g. 
the “production contract” where management teams can earn a bonus if they are 
able to delivery shipments on time and within the pre-determined costs. Others 
invest in new equipment to improve the productivity. For instance, the Tianhai 
Decorative Warpknitted Fabric Co. in Guangdong has imported 30 computerized 
multi-bar raschel machines for the newly developed 44-inch wide lace fabric, and 
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became the largest specialized lace manufacturer in China. In cellular phone 
manufacturing, Motorola’s EJV in Hangzhou went from a complete reliance on 
imported components to sourcing half of its components locally, reducing costs 
and facilitating “Just-in-Time” (JIT) production. Most well-funded textile firms in 
China are focusing their R&D resources on producing higher value-added 
products, e.g. waterproof and ventilated fibres, dirt-repellent fibres, silk-like fibres, 
suede-like fibres, etc. (Field survey, 2000, 2001).  
In the beverage industry, the Wahaha Group is an example of a firm that is 
developing new brand names and building its own distribution channels. It was 
established by three managers from a SOE with 140,000 yuan who built up the 
brand name through children’s drinks fifteen years ago. A number of EJVs were 
subsequently formed and the group now has 55 bottling plants (employing 30,000 
workers) and accounts for 30% of the Chinese beverage market. The group has 
diversified into fruit drinks, tea, mineral water, etc. In 1998, it launched the 
“Special Coke” (Feichang Kele) and it now ranks third in the Coke market in 
China, achieving a “comparable market share with that of Pepsi Cola” (Coca Cola 
ranked first) (Field survey, 2001).12 In the automobile components sector, the 
privately-funded Qianjian Spring Factory in Hangzhou is an example of a firm 
developing a niche market by strictly controlling quality and integrating into the 
supply chain of automobile assemblers. It was established by Mr. Yong-sen Zhang 
in 1988 with the tiny of 800 yuan. By 1996, the firm was securing OEMs 
contracts on suspension and engine springs from major automobile assembly 
plants in China, e.g. Shanghai Volkswagen, Guangzhou Honda, First Automobile, 
etc. In 2000, the firm was employing 120 workers and recorded sales value of 28 
million yuan (Ibid.). 
No matter how hard managers try to develop their products, they cannot 
avoid the fact that there is still a big gap between TNCs and Chinese firms in 
R&D capabilities. The president of TCL, one of the biggest TV manufacturers in 
China, frankly admitted that their cost efficiency is still well behind that of the 
TNCs and many of their products use patents and technology belonging to TNCs 
(SCMP, 30 October 2001). Moreover, Chinese manufacturers do not have the 
capital reserves to endure a prolonged period of heavy losses when attempting to 
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conquer a new market, compared with the deep-pocketed TNCs. These points 
have already been meticulously documented by Nolan (2001a, 2001b) and Yeung 
(2002a). 
Instead of being constrained by limited R&D capabilities, when trying to 
persuade decision-makers at a TNC’s headquarters that China is not just a 
manufacturing base for labour-intensive and low value-added projects, managers 
of JVs in China are encountering issues of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
related to product development. The crux of the issue is with which JV(s) should 
the TNC invest the capital and technology to develop the new products. Being the 
minority owner (with 40% of the equity), Motorola (US) is reluctant to invest 
capital and transfer the latest manufacturing technology on CDMA phones to the 
EJV in Hangzhou. Moreover, Motorola worries that its IPRs will be infringed, 
should it use the EJV as the launch pad for its latest products. As the EJV’s 
Deputy General Manager commented, “The product can be pirated even before it 
is launched officially!” (Field survey, 2001). The uncertainty surrounding new 
product development not only affects the long-term development strategy of the 
EJV, but also the retention of the managerial and technical staff (Ibid.). 
The above discussions lend support to the hypothesis on product and 
market development. To minimize the effects of potential trade disputes and to 
improve the product competitiveness, Chinese manufacturers are upgrading the 
value-added chain of their products and to diversify their markets. 
In reality, the drive of manufacturers for product development may lead to 
other managerial issues at firm’s level. The experience of Siemens’ EJV in 
Hangzhou illustrates what can happen when senior managers differ over product 
development strategy. Being the majority owner holding 51% of the equity, 
Siemens appointed a German engineer as the General Manager when the EJV was 
established in 1995. The (Chinese) Deputy General Manager realized that there 
was a golden opportunity for the firm to introduce the GIS high voltage electric 
circuit-breaker to China. Despite gaining approval from headquarters for the 
adoption of Siemens’ technological “crown jewel”, the General Manager in 
Hangzhou refused to adopt the technology. In 2000, Siemens established another 
EJV in Shanghai using the GIS manufacturing process. The new EJV has already 
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recorded sales of 150 million yuan in the first nine months of its operation. It is 
expected the new EJV in Shanghai will soon become the most profitable of 
Siemens’ 54 JVs in China (Ibid.). 
As the head of what is currently the most profitable Siemens’ JV in China, 
with 550 million yuan of sales and 100 million yuan of profits in 2000, it can be 
argued that the (German) General Manager is behaving relatively 
“conservatively” by focusing on the cost efficiency of the existing production line 
(i.e. by regarding China as a low cost manufacturing base for uniform products) 
rather than by taking the “unnecessary risk” of introducing new products without a 
strong existing market demand (Ibid.). Paradoxically, the “production-oriented” 
managerial approach undertaken by the General Manager implies that he may be 
detached from the potentialities of market demand due to the lack of a harmonious 
and well co-ordinated working relationship with his Chinese colleagues (see 
below). In stark contrast, the (Chinese) Deputy General Manager understands that 
the long-term competitiveness of the firm is based on its ability to introduce 
innovative and higher value-added products to target a niche market. This is 
especially the case after China’s entry into the WTO, where the firm is facing 
intense competition locally (including other Siemens’ JVs) and internationally 
(including the parallel import of Siemens’ products). The bottom line is that he 
has little to lose but everything to gain, either staying in Siemens or joining other 
companies, should his plan succeed. Nonetheless, this may not be the case for the 
General Manager. Despite his international experience and technical expertise, his 
job opportunities are more limited than those of his Chinese counterparts because 
of the increasing tendency by foreign firms to localize their management in China 
(see below).  
“Globalized” Vs “Localized” Localization 
The localization of management is receiving greater attention from owners and 
general managers of Chinese manufacturing firms after WTO accession. While 
expatriates can bring advanced managerial and technical know-how to a firm, 
there are three possible drawbacks for firms with a high ratio of expatriates on 
their payrolls. 
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First, firms have higher ratios of expatriates may have difficulty localizing 
their senior managers. Expatriate staff in China often enjoy much more favourable 
remuneration packages than those of their local counterparts with similar 
qualifications and job responsibilities, e.g. the remuneration package of an 
American expatriate (US$300,000/year) is six times higher than that of a Chinese 
executive (Li and Kleiner, 2001:51). The perceived lack of promotion 
opportunities, “discriminatory” remuneration packages, and the abundance of job 
opportunities in the market all contribute to the high turnover rates of mid-ranking 
local managers in JVs (Lasserre and Chin, 1997:94; Goodall and Burgers, 1998).13 
As the average tenure for mid- to high-level Chinese managerial staff was 8-12 
months, the lack of continuity of the management team interrupts the firms’ daily 
production (Field survey, 2001; Chan and Cui, 2002:15). This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis 3a. 
Second, expatriate managers stationed in China may have less contact with 
the market. They may not have the incentive or ability to follow the most up-to-
date market information, partly because of their “temporary” job assignments in 
China (Li and Kleiner, 2001:52). Quite often, this leads to conflicts between 
managers of the marketing department (who are on the front lines of the market) 
and other operational departments when their information about the (international) 
market demand differs. This is demonstrated by the refusal of the General 
Manager in Siemens’ EJV to adopt the advanced manufacturing technology that 
was mentioned previously (Field survey, 2001). The above evidence supports the 
hypothesis 3b. 
Third, cultural differences and language barriers may contribute to the lack 
of a harmonious working relationship between expatriates and locals. Some 
expatriates (including overseas Chinese) may be rather self-centred and even 
arrogant in dealing with their local counterparts, i.e. in thinking that they need to 
“teach” their Chinese colleagues everything from day one, and so on. Expatriates 
also tend to sack workers who either under-perform or violate company rules, on 
the spot and in front of other workers, whilst the local managers tend to talk to the 
workers concerned privately (to “save their face”) and either give them a “second 
chance” or ask them to resign. 14  This is illustrated by the experience of a 
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European-based TNC’s EJV in China, where the wife of an expatriate “scolded 
the Chinese workers and threatened to sack them publicly, despite the fact that she 
is not a staff member of the JV or of the European-based firm” (Ibid.). Due to the 
cultural conflicts between the expatriates and the locals, six of the seven local 
engineers quitted the US-financed manufacturing firm after they had helped the 
firm to acquire ISO9002 qualification (Li and Kleiner, 2001:53). This finding 
validates the hypothesis 3c. 
The above discussions provide a prima facie case to support the hypothesis 
on localization: foreign-financed firms are accelerating their localization of 
management in China, especially after WTO accession.15 It must be emphasized 
that localization in China is more complicated than simply being a case of 
replacing expatriates with local talent.16 In practice, localization in China can be 
generalized into at least two categories, according to the work experience and 
educational background of managers: “globalized localization”, where 
expatriates are replaced by overseas Chinese or Mainland Chinese with overseas 
experience, and “localized localization”, where expatriates are replaced by 
mainland Chinese who have worked their way through the ranks but who possess 
limited or no overseas experience. This complex situation can be illustrated by the 
experience of two JVs in China. 
The experience of the Siemens’ EJV exemplifies the need for “globalized 
localization”, due to the detached market information of the expatriate General 
Manager. Partly due to cultural differences, the General Manager questioned the 
validity of his Deputy (who is a mainland Chinese with extensive overseas 
experience) because he spent so much time visiting and dining with potential 
customers all over China. Yet the Deputy General Manager complained that his 
European superior did not understand the way of doing business in China: “He 
expected that I only have to cultivate guanxi with the people who are in charge 
and with whom we are doing business, but not with my other ‘old friends’” (Field 
survey, 2001). In other words, there is a need to cultivate personal connections, 
guanxi, with potential as well as with existing customers. This is vital for the 
competitiveness for the EJV after WTO accession as “there are few differences in 
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terms of technicality between the products manufactured by this EJV and other 
TNCs, so the established customer network can make a difference” (Ibid.).17 
The experience of a US-financed EJV demonstrates the need for “localized 
localization” due to the lack of a harmonious working relationship between 
overseas Chinese and local managers. During our visit to the firm, the (Chinese) 
Deputy General Manager openly criticized the present trend of recruiting young 
Chinese with freshly minted overseas MBAs: “Their senior positions and high 
salaries are based on their university diplomas rather than on their proven job 
performance” (Ibid.). This phenomenon suggests that the existing trend of 
recruiting foreign-educated or overseas Chinese without working experience in 
China may backfire, as this will lead to resentment and infighting rather than co-
operation between managers. Freshly minted overseas MBAs or those with years 
of international experience may have fresh mindsets and ambition, but their lack 
of practical working experience in China may also lead to direct conflict with the 
conservative “old guards”, who have risen through the ranks after decades of 
working. This is especially the case when the localization process is implemented 
too quickly, as illustrated by the food and beverage processing EJV of Nestlé in 
Guangdong. After implementing the localization policy in 1997, the new 
management team took over the firm too quickly, and the lack of trust between the 
(new) top and (old) mid-ranking managers subsequently resulted in a number of 
internal wrangles and even allegations of rent seeking, nepotism, etc. (Field 
survey, 2000). If this phenomenon of infighting is widespread in China, this may 
have tremendous implications for the recent drive by Chinese firms (including 
privately and state-owned) to recruit overseas Chinese to improve their 
competitiveness. 
The excess demand for experienced local managers in China is expected to 
increase after WTO accession. A survey revealed that 40% of JVs in 
manufacturing, retailing, banking and telecommunications sectors intend to 
localize their senior executives in China (TST, 20 April 2002). The use of head-
hunters to poach experienced managers from competitors has already contributed 
to wage inflation (specifically, inflation of the remuneration package). With the 
expected rush among foreign investors to gain a foothold in China, “bidding war” 
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for experienced and qualified local managers will heat up. If this “bidding war” 
goes unchecked, it may lead to a vicious circle of “wage inflation and job-
hopping”. This would not only partially offset the cost advantages of localization, 
but also disrupt the long-term development strategies of firms in China. This may 
also be of importance if the firms have to comply with international standards 
audits. 
Compliance with International and Regional Standards 
Apart from issues outlined explicitly in the WTO accession treaties, the 
proliferation of international and regional standards in the global manufacturing 
sectors has far-reaching implications for the management of Chinese 
manufacturing firms (Yeung and Mok, forthcoming). In addition to the ISOs, 
which is normally (though wrongly) regarded as the benchmark for quality and 
environmental friendliness, managers of Chinese manufacturers also have to be 
aware of the SA8000 and other regional standards that may be required by 
importing countries.18 
Securing the ISOs certification is a challenge for managers. As of 2001, 
only seven out of 31 interviewed firms were in compliance with ISO9000. All 
certified firms are either publicly listed companies or subsidiaries of TNCs. Even 
Motorola’s EJV was only certified as ISO9000 compliant in 1999, three years 
after its establishment (Field survey, 2000, 2001). This can probably be explained 
by the fact that the implementation of ISO standards demands a new mindset of 
managers and workers. Despite the managerial challenges, most managers are 
willing to train their workforce to achieve ISO9000 certification, partly to fulfil 
their customers’ requirements and partly to improve quality control processes. The 
systematic documentation demanded by ISO9000 assists the firms in maintaining 
the quality of their products at a pre-determined level (Ibid.). 
As with ISO9000, ISO14000 not only demands detailed and systematic 
documentation but also focuses on environmental management. Many managers 
are reluctant to implement the ISO14000 standard as it demands tremendous 
investment in environmentally friendly equipment, and on monitoring and 
measurement devices to ensure that the emission of pollutants is minimal, etc. The 
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investment can be prohibitively high for some managers. This is illustrated by the 
Qianjian Spring Factory mentioned previously. To keep the OEMs contracts, the 
firm not only has to invest heavily on environmentally friendly equipment, but 
also has to retrain its workers to document each batch of products systematically. 
This will however impose tremendous pressure on the cash flow of this SME, in 
addition to the competitive pressure of the significant reduction in import tariffs 
for foreign springs. In the case of Motorola’s EJV, it was not yet ISO14000 
compliant as of 2001 (but the manager planned to get the certification “soon”) 
(Ibid.). 
Regarding social accountability, SA8000 covers the International Labour 
Organization’s Conventions on Labour Rights, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(SAI, 1997:4-8). Even if the manager is willing to adopt the system 
wholeheartedly, it is very costly to fully implement the SA8000. To pacify 
customers and ensure that “scandals” on child labour and “sweatshop” will not be 
publicized by labour rights groups, a number of major US/EU department stores 
have insisted that their suppliers and subcontractors to adopt SA8000 or acquire 
similar certification. For instance, the May Department Store (US) has a special 
Asia-China Division to scrutinize the working environment of its clothing 
subcontractors in Asia. The Director of a sub-contractor privately admitted that “it 
is impossible to fully fulfil all the requirements laid out by the SA8000 
certification. The production costs are simply too high to remain competitive 
while doing so.” (Field survey, 2001). This is especially the case for overtime 
work, where the standard imposes a limit of 12 hours of overtime per week on top 
of a maximum 48 hours of regular shifts (SAI, 1997:6). Due to the short product 
cycle of the clothing, footwear and toys markets, it is very costly for sub-
contractors to employ and train more workers during the period of peak market 
demand and sack them during the period of low demand. This explains why 
overtime work is very common in China in firms producing clothing, toys and 
shoes, regardless of their size. This is exemplified by the experience of 
Taiwanese-financed Chung Hoo Shoes Factory in Guangdong, the sub-contractor 
for Converse and Skechers. The firm was stripped by SAI from its approved lists 
of certified factories in 2000 after their 3,000 workers were found to have 
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regularly exceeded the working limit of 60-hour-per-week. 19  The Marketing 
Manager for C.D. Star, which owns the factory, complained that “being SAI-
certified … has made us a target.” (FEER, 10 May 2001:40-41). 
Moreover, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the firm to ensure that 
there is no child labour in the firm, partly due to the fact that a large number of 
workers are involved, most of them are migrant workers about whose dates of 
birth the local Public Security Bureau lacks accurate information. The widespread 
availability of false identity cards in China further hampers the process of 
verification. Probably the most difficult item of SA8000 to achieve is the demand 
faced by certified firms to ensure that their suppliers and sub-contractors are 
conforming to the same standards of social accountability (SAI, 1997:7). In reality, 
it is too costly to demand that all suppliers implement SA8000, as there are dozens 
of major suppliers for a single firm. Managers of large-scale firms may be able to 
use their market power as leverage on their major suppliers. Managers of SMEs 
however simply do not have the market power to impose any control over their 
suppliers, other than on product requirements. 
The above discussions support the hypothesis on international standards. 
In reality, Chinese manufacturers not only have to aware the compliance with 
international standards, but also have to aware that some importing countries may 
apply other regional standards, which may impose more stringent requirements. 
This is especially the case for the so-called “green” standards or even the more 
broadly defined “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) (WTO, 2002c). 20  In 
China, only 17 out of 21,000 textile and clothing firms have received the “green 
certificate”, which allows their products to be exempted from the stringent 
inspections. Other firms without the relevant certificates may have their products 
returned, e.g. in December 2001, 300,000 jackets were returned to China from 
Europe because the metal in the zip did not meet the EU’s safety standards. It is 
estimated that about 15% of textile and clothing products in China did not fulfil 
the “green standards” and this affected about US$8 billion of exports (CEI, 14 
January 2002; SCMP, 7 January 2002). For those factories without the relevant 
certificates, the buyers of their products will have to budget for the higher 
transaction costs of stringent inspections by importing countries. This is 
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equivalent to the lowering of a firm’s competitiveness. Another challenge for 
managers is the common existence of counterfeit “green” products. They have to 
ensure that when purchasing equipment, they will really able to fulfil the stringent 
requirements outlined by the ISO14000 or other “green” standards. They also 
have to “fight” counterfeits of their own products, which may sabotage their hard-
earned reputation from investment on expensive, environmentally friendly 
equipment and retraining of workers, e.g. the Chinese government discovered that 
90% of 250 products in Shanghai and Guangdong, proclaimed as being 
environmentally, were counterfeits (SCMP, 7 January 2002). 
CONCLUSIONS 
While we acknowledge the firm-specific limitations of our study, the 
empirical evidence presented above can provide a prima facie case to support the 
four research hypotheses on the managerial challenges for Chinese manufacturing. 
The tentative conclusions of this study are summarized in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
The first hypothesis – China’s accession to the WTO will drive Chinese 
manufacturers to develop contingency plans for handling the potential trade 
disputes with international trading partners – is verified. WTO accession will not 
reduce the possibility of trade disputes between China and other countries for at 
least another 14 years, where importing countries can still use their current anti-
dumping methodology (treating China as a “non-market economy”), special 
safeguards and product-specific safeguard mechanisms during the transitional 
period. As a number of LDCs are relying on low value-added exports, in which 
Chinese manufacturers are more competitive, managers will have to develop 
contingency measures for trade disputes with DCs and LDCs (Table 1). Apart 
from accepting the hypothesis on trade disputes, this study suggests that managers 
are likely to encounter an uphill battle in any future trade disputes, since neither 
they nor the Chinese government is well prepared for the accession. No matter 
how efficient the WTO resolution mechanism for trade disputes, the reality is that 
managers are either without the capital to fight allegations of dumping, or will 
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have to divert valuable resources from product and market development, which 
will have significant implications for the long-term competitiveness of a firm. 
The second hypothesis – China’s accession to the WTO will drive Chinese 
manufacturers to upgrade the value-added chain of their products and to diversify 
their markets – is supported. Managers are upgrading and localizing the value-
added chain of their products and diversifying their markets to minimize the 
potential effects of trade disputes and improve the firms’ competitiveness from the 
onslaught of competitive products manufactured or imported directly by TNCs 
and their subsidiaries. Such threats will arise due to the lowering of import tariffs 
and the opening up of distribution channels in China (Table 1). In addition to the 
competition from direct and parallel imports, managers of Sino-foreign JVs will 
have to persuade their bosses at headquarters to transfer advanced manufacturing 
technology for the latest products to the JVs, as China is not just a cost-effective 
manufacturing base for labour-intensive, low value-added products alone. 
Moreover, they have to guard the transferred technologies from piracy, and thus 
their competitive advantage over their competitors. 
There are support for the third hypothesis: China’s accession to the WTO 
will drive Chinese manufacturers to accelerate the localization of management. In 
fact, WTO accession not only accelerates the processes of management 
localization, but also highlights the importance of “getting the strategy right” – to 
decide on the appropriate localization strategy and the pace of its implementation. 
For general managers and human resources managers, the goals are to maintain a 
harmonious working relationship between expatriates and locals, and between 
overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese, and to retain the motivation and loyalty 
of the existing mid-ranking managers and prevent them from being headhunted by 
competitors (Table 1). Due to wage inflation caused by the “bidding war” for 
experienced local managers, they also have to be aware that localization will not 
necessarily lead to reductions in executive labour costs. 
The fourth hypothesis – China’s accession to the WTO will catalyze 
Chinese manufacturers to be aware of the need for the compliance with 
international standards – is confirmed. Moreover, this study suggests that 
managers have to strike a balance between fulfilling international standards and 
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maintaining a product’s competitiveness (Table 1). This not only involves the 
retraining of the workforce, but also requires the implementation of corresponding 
complementary policies by the government, e.g. regulations on migrant workers. 
Apart from the high costs of implementing international standards (which partially 
offset the low nominal labour costs), some importing countries may use these 
standards as non-trade barriers to protect their local industries from “hollowing 
out” by Chinese products. This is especially the case for the TBT or “green 
standards”, where each importing country or region can have their own 
regulations and standards and pursue the “necessary measures” to enforce them. 
The transaction costs for managers to comply with these national standards are 
even higher than for the international standards. 
All in all, managers of manufacturing firms in China have to strike a 
delicate balance in dealing with these challenges under the constraints of time and 
available resources. It must be emphasized that these four categories of challenges 
are interrelated, and one should not focus on one challenge without paying 
attention to the possible implications for others. For example, the policy for 
product development and the policy for localization may not complement each 
other. The drive for localization demands cutting labour costs, while the drive for 
R&D demands engineers and product designers with innovative ideas. This is one 
of the reasons why a number of firms are recruiting overseas Chinese, i.e. 
“globalized localization”. With their overseas experience, “overseas Chinese” are 
presumed to be more innovative than local talents, but are also more expensive. 
Partly because of the “overseas” experience of the newly recruited Chinese 
engineers, general managers are encountering another potential challenge in the 
form of trade disputes. Sometimes, a “big-hit” in the international market may 
invite “tactical” lawsuits filed by competitors.21 Other foreign competitors may 
also persuade their countries’ regulatory authorities to adopt a new set of national 
standards to forbid the import of a newly developed product. Obviously, the 
managerial skills of managers of manufacturing firms in China will be severely 
tested after China’s entry into the WTO. 
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1.  For accounts of the historical background to, and the politics surrounding the WTO 
accession, see Lai (2001) and Fewsmith (2001). 
2.  In this study, “Chinese firms” or “Chinese manufacturers” is a generic term referring to 
both foreign-financed and locally-funded manufacturing firms located in mainland China. 
3.  The PNTR status entails levying the same tariffs on Chinese imports as on the imports of 
the US’s other major trading partners. The bilateral deals between China and the US are 
“multi-lateralized” to all WTO members. 
4.  The bureaucracy associated with production contracts and other import documentation has 
been discussed by Yeung and Mok (2002). 
5.     The 36 interviewed manufacturers and their positions are as follows: four owners, three 
Presidents, one Vice-president, 13 General Managers, three Deputy General Managers, two 
Financial Managers, nine Factory/Production Managers and one external consultant for a 
textile firm. 
6.  See Yeung (2001:3-7) for a detailed classification of FDI in China. 
7.  China was excluded from the ATC before joining the WTO (Ianchovichina and Martin, 
2001:10). 
8.  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (The Anti-Dumping 
Agreement) allows importing countries to take action against dumping (WTO, 2002a). 
9.  The TRIPS regulates the trading of products with ideas and knowledge involving 
copyrights, trademarks, patents, undisclosed information (including trade secrets), etc. 
(WTO, 2002b). 
10.      Michalopoulos (2001:189) argues that “[t]he WTO agreements have no explicit requirement 
for member states to be market economies.” If China is admitted into the WTO with the 
status of a “transitional economy”, the regulatory authorities should compare the production 
costs locally (or the representative export price of the product to a third country) when 
determining whether a firm is guilty of dumping (WTO, 2002a). 
11.  China drew up its first anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulation in 1997 (SCMP, 6 
December 2001).  
12.  Readers interested on the business development of Coca-Cola in China can refer to Nolan 
(1995) and Mok, Dai and Yeung (forthcoming). 
13.  Li and Kleiner (2001:53) suggest that the institutionalized differential power often protects 
the expatriates even they are less competent than the locals. Braun and Warner (2002:569) 
reveal that most TNCs in China do not adjust their performance appraisal systems 
according to Chinese cultural norms.  
14.  Readers interested on the concept of “face” (mianzi) can refer to Redding (1993) and Chen 
(1995). 
15.      Two recent surveys also revealed that there is a global trend of importing fewer expatriates, 
and that the sky-high remuneration packages and monetary incentives for expatriates could 
be coming to an end in China (SCMP, 16 September 2002:4; TST, 20 April 2002). 
16.  Conventionally, localization is defined as replacing expatriates with local talent, together 
with the delegation of decision-making authority to local executives in a planned manner to 
assure continuity, so as to achieve the firm’s objectives (Wong and Law, 1999). 
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17.  There is vast amount of literature on the significance of guanxi in doing business in China 
despite its high transaction costs. Among others, see Yeung (2001) and Davies et al. 
(2003)(forthcoming). 
18.  Developed by the International Organization for Standardization, ISOs are generic 
management system standards. ISO9000 is concerned with “quality management” (i.e. 
whether the firm has done everything to ensure that its products conform to the customer’s 
requirements), while ISO14000 is about the “environmental management system” (i.e. 
whether the firm has done everything to ensure that a product will have the least harmful 
impact on the environment during production or disposal) (ISO, 2001). Designed and 
monitored by the Social Accountability International, Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) 
is focused on the “social accountability” of the firm’s activities (SAI, 1997:4). 
19.  By law, workers are not allowed to work more than 11 hours/day. However, it is not 
uncommon for workers in Guangdong to work up to 18 hours/day between July and 
September to fulfil Christmas orders from McDonald’s, Mattel, Disney, etc. This partly 
explains the high number of industrial accidents in China (SCMP, 29 October 2001, see 
also Yeung, 2001:183-188). 
20.  “Green standards” is a set of technical standards to protect the importing country’s 
environment, which should, in principle, be covered by the ISO14000. TBT is a set of 
technical regulations and standards that importing countries consider appropriate to protect 
the health and safety of their citizens, animals, plants and the environment, etc. The WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade aims to ensure that regional technical standards 
for imports do not create unnecessary obstacles for trade, but it does not prevent member 
countries from taking “necessary measures” to ensure their standards are met (WTO, 
2002c). 
21.     The dispute between BYD in Shenzhen (the largest maker of rechargeable batteries in China) 
and Sanyo Energy (US) (the subsidiary of Sanyo Electric) serves as an example. Sanyo 
Energy recently filed a patent infringement lawsuit against BYD. Analysts suggest that this 
actually reflects a desperate bid by Sanyo Energy to halt the defection of its customers to 
BYD, after the Shenzhen-based firm became the largest supplier of lithium ion batteries to 
Motorola and then won contracts from Nokia (TS, 26 September 2002). 
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Table 1 




Preparing for trade 
disputes 
• To become familiar with the procedures on dealing with 
allegations of dumping and other trade disputes with DCs or 
LDCs under the WTO resolution mechanism 
• To develop contingency measures for trade disputes 
• To maintain cash flow and production while the firm is appealing 
against dumping duties imposed by importing countries 
• To co-ordinate with local and central governments on 
investigations and to lobby for their support 
For OEMs or sub-contractors: 
• To upgrade and localize the value-added chain of their products, 
given limited capital and R&D capability 
• To develop one’s own brand name 
• To develop niche markets, either locally or internationally 
Developing products 
and markets  
For JVs: 
• To persuade headquarters to transfer advanced technology and the 
latest products to the JVs 
• To protect the IPRs (manufacturing processes and technologies 
associated with the new products) from piracy 
• To compete with imported products (from other TNCs), including 
parallel imports of products of the same brand 
Choosing the best 
localization strategy: 
• To maintain a harmonious working relationship between 
expatriates and locals, i.e. to minimize potential conflicts due to 
differences in culture, language, or management style 
• To maintain the loyalty and motivation of the local mid-ranking 
managers and the continuity of the management team 
• To decide on the localization strategy (“globalized localization” 
Vs “localized localization”) and the pace of its implementation 
(the transitional period between the new and old management 
teams) 




• To strike a balance between fulfilling international standards and 
maintaining a product’s competitiveness, including to re-train 
workers to handle new work practices complying with 
international standards and yet to keep costs down 
• To secure existing OEMs / sub-contracting deals while preparing 
for certification 
• To persuade major customers that it may not be possible to fully 
implement certain international standards (SA8000) without 
corresponding complementary government policies 
• To aware of and to prepare for contingency measures by 
importing countries using regional or national standards (e.g. TBT 
or the “green standard”) as non-trade barriers 
Source: Authors. 
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